groups each represent about 25 percent of New York City residents, they compose 52 and 32 percent of MPV arrestees for 2000-2003 respectively. African-American and Hispanic MPV arrestees have also fared worse in the criminal justice system: they were more likely than their white counterparts to be detained before arraignment (2.66 and 1.85 times more likely, respectively), convicted (both twice as likely) and sentenced to additional jail time (4 and 3 times more likely, respectively). 5 In a city in which tensions between the police and the minority community were already running high as a result of (potentially productive) NYPD efforts targeted at guns and serious violent crime, stopping minority residents at disproportionately high rates for smoking marijuana in public seemed unlikely to do much to ease this friction.
We have reviewed and analyzed the MPV arrest data and have only one thing to add: In addition to imposing costs disproportionately on New York City's minority residents, there is no good evidence that this "reefer madness" policing strategy contributed to the decline in the sorts of serious crimes that are of greatest public concern in New York City. In order to justify the substantial race disparity in marijuana arrests, the NYPD must believe that some important social objective is being accomplished. This larger objective is presumably not reducing marijuana consumption per se, and seems more likely to be the intention of reducing more serious offenses under the standard "broken windows" argument articulated nearly 25 years ago by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. 6 Perhaps the belief that this policing strategy can reduce serious crime might also stem from the hypothesized link between drug markets and violence, even though most criminologists believe that violence is much less common in the market for marijuana than that for, say, crack cocaine. The psychopharmacological effects of marijuana use on criminal or violent behavior are also believed to be much less pronounced than with many other commonly-used drugs, including alcohol.
In any case, whatever the conceptual underpinning of this marijuana policing strategy, we have analyzed the MPV arrests building on our previous research on broken windows policing 7 and, using a number of different statistical approaches on these MPV arrest data, we find no good evidence that the MPV arrests are associated with reductions 5 Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap 2006:___. 6 Wilson and Kelling 1982. 7 Harcourt and Ludwig 2006.
in serious violent or property crimes in the city. As a result New York City's marijuana policing strategy seems likely to simply divert scarce police resources away from more effective approaches that research suggests is capable of reducing real crime. The trouble with this standard panel-data setup is that it ignores mean reversion. Any the 1990s (the others being increased incarceration and spending on police, and abortion legalization in the early 1970s). 12 We would expect places that were hit hardest by crack to show the largest subsequent declines in crime when crack's impact begins to dissipate.
A natural concern is that mean reversion may be at work at the police precinct level Why do precincts with unusually high initial crime rates experience unusually large declines in crime thereafter? Mean reversion seems to be an important explanation. Panel D shows that, as is true with city-level crime data, those police precincts with the largest increases in crime during the crack epidemic have the largest declines thereafter.
We can illustrate the basic idea somewhat more formally by estimating a firstdifference model that relates changes across precincts from 1989 to 2000 in precinct violent crime to changes over this period in precinct MPV misdemeanor arrests, controlling for other changes in explanatory variables. One advantage of this specification over the standard panel-data setup as in equation (1) is to allow for a very straightforward way to control for the possibility of mean reversion, by explicitly conditioning on the magnitude of each precinct's increase in violent crime during the crack epidemic. 13 The basic estimating equation is as follows:
The results of this first-difference analysis, reported in Robust standard errors in brackets. Models 3 through 6 exclude NYPD precinct 49, because we have no crime data for that precinct for 1984; Models 4 though 6 exclude NYPD precinct 22 (Central Park) because there are no controls for drugs, unemployment and youth population. * = statistically significant at 5% cut-off ** = statistically significant at 1% cut-off
The positive relationship between the change in MPV arrests and serious crime, when prior crime levels is held constant, means that, controlling for mean reversion, an increase in MPV arrests over the period translates into an increase in serious crime-not, as the broken windows theory would predict, a decrease in serious crime. This is exactly
the opposite of what we would want in terms of the effect of MPV arrests. It suggests that this policing strategy focused on misdemeanor MPV arrests is having exactly the wrong effect on serious crime-increasing it, rather than decreasing it. The final column of Table 2 reveals that, in a "horse race" comparison of the effect of changes in misdemeanor MPV arrest rates and non-MPV misdemeanor arrest rates, both are positively related and statistically significant-though the effect of MPV arrest rates on crime is much larger.
These conclusions are, overall, consistent with our earlier statistical findings concerning the effect of total misdemeanor arrests on serious crime in New York City, presented in Broken Windows. 16 In that research, we used a similar approach to analyze the relationship between changes in total misdemeanor arrests within New York City precincts from 1989 to 1998 and changes in the violent crime rate. We found that, if anything, increases in misdemeanor arrests were accompanied by increases in violent crime. While the positive relationship between changes in misdemeanor arrests and changes in violent crime was somewhat sensitive to the model specification, there was no evidence from that first-difference model of a negative relationship between changes in total misdemeanor arrests and violent crime. We concluded there that the evidence, as shown in our original Table 3 in Harcourt and Ludwig 2006, was not consistent with the idea that stepped-up zero-tolerance policing reduces crime. We reproduce here Table 3 from that study.
14 See Raphael and Ludwig 2003: 265 (positing that the reduction in violence in such areas finds its root, not in federalized prosecution of eligible gun offenses, but rather in the fact that the violence accompanying the introduction of crack cocaine in the 1980s had run its course by the late 1990s). 15 
II. Shifting the Burden of Proof Where Such Strong Evidence of Racial Disparities Exists
The policy recommendations advanced by Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap seem appropriate, especially in light of our further findings. We would add just one important suggestion that would place the burden of explaining the impact of public policies in cases like this-where there is such strong prima facie evidence of disparate racial and ethnic impact across a range of criminal justice outcomes-on the agency with the most information: courts especially, but legislative bodies as well, should shift the burden of proof onto governmental agencies when there is strong facial evidence of discrimination.
In effect, courts should introduce a Batson-type analysis in reviewing claims of intentional discrimination in policing. This could be done either through the judicial adoption of a Batson-framework or by legislative action. Under a Batson-type approach, significant statistical discrepancies in the race of persons arrested, detained, convicted, and sentenced would satisfy the first prong of the analysis and set forth a prima facie case. This would shift the burden to the governmental agency to then explain the reason for the disparities. In this case, the police department or units would then be required either to offer race-neutral reasons for the disparities-that is, to offer other factors that, when held constant, eliminate the racial correlation with arrests-or to present evidence that race is a statistically significant predictor of serious crime and that profiling satisfies the limited conditions that make it constitutionally acceptable to use race-namely, that it is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 17 If the state satisfies its burden, then the challenging party should have the opportunity to rebut the state's evidence.
Over the spectrum of policing initiatives, the NYPD may have legitimate reasons to engage in policing interventions that have disparate impact on racial or ethnic groups as compared to their representation in the resident population. It may be the case, for instance, that a racial or ethnic group represents a higher proportion of the offending population than it does the resident population. Or it may be that other legitimate characteristics proxy on race or ethnicity. Disparate impact is not, in itself, prohibited.
But where there is such strong evidence of disparate impact, the burden should be on the agency with the information to explain what is causing the imbalance.
What our findings do add to this analysis is that they would preclude the NYPD from arguing that profiling Hispanic and African-American residents in the MPV context is narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest of combating serious crime. Even though this may be an interest that satisfies equal protection analysis in come cases, there is no evidence that the broken windows MPV strategy has had the desired effect on serious crime.
III. Conclusion
New York City's psychedelic experiment with misdemeanor MPV arrests-along with all the associated detentions, convictions, and additional incarcerations-represent a tremendously expensive policing intervention. As Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap document well, the focus on MPV has had a significant disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic residents. Our study further shows that there is no good evidence that it contributed to combating serious crime in the city. If anything, it has had the reverse effect. As a result, the NYPD policy of misdemeanor MPV arrests represents an 17 There is some controversy over whether combating serious crime amounts to a compelling state interest that would allow the police to use race explicitly in policing. Hall and the Wall Street area, as well as NYPD precinct 22, the Central Park precinct.
Residential population numbers here are simply inapposite. Since the residential population numbers are not necessarily related to day-time population numbers, it is more conservative to use counts rather than rates.
One challenge for our study is that data on important potential confounding factors proportionately to the tract's land area. 19 We use these census data to calculate measures of each precinct's distribution of youths (19 to 24) and racial and ethnic composition. 19 Suppose for example that census tract 1 lies entirely within precinct A, tract 2 lies entirely within precinct B, but 25 percent of the land area of tract 3 is in precinct A while 75 percent of the land area of tract 3 is within precinct B. Let X i be some population characteristic for tract (i), such as percent poor, and let P i represent the population of tract (i). In this case we calculate percent population poor in precinct A as (P 1 ×X 1 +(0.25)P 3 ×X 3 )/(P 1 +(0.25)P 3 ).
We have also included, using the same method, other covariates consisting of measures of each precinct's age distribution, poverty rate, female-headed households, fraction of adults with different levels of educational attainment, median income, and welfare receipt. To measure physical signs of disorder we control for the fraction of housing units in the precinct that are vacant. These measures capture structural disadvantage (percent of the precinct that is poor, receiving public assistance, or has less than a high school degree), demographics (percent of the precinct in their peak offending ages, percent of households headed by a female, percent black), and measures of physical disorder (percent of housing units that are vacant).
Finally, we also incorporated into our dataset a measure of the number of police officers assigned to each precinct in each year by the NYPD. One important conceptual concern is whether its key explanatory variable of interest-the misdemeanor arrest rate-captures the effects of changes in how police resources are deployed or instead simply reflects increased police presence. This explanation is of some concern because, from 1994 to 1998 the size of the NYPD force increased by about a half. harcourt@uchicago.edu
